## HMNZS NGAPONA ASSOCIATION INC

# LONGCAST

10 December 21 - Navy Club Lunch

17 December 21 - Ngapona Assn Lunch at Orakei RSA

21 January 22 - Ngapona Assn Lunch at Titirangi RSA

Hi Folks

#### **NGAPONA ASSOCIATION - NOVEMBER LUNCH**

Unless something extraordinary happens in the near future it looks as though we will have to cancel our November Lunch at the Grey Lynn RSA.

Lets hope we can have a really good one in December!

Hope you have all had your second vaccination.

### **NEW PATROL BOAT FOR PNG**

Austal Australia has delivered the 13th Guardian-class Patrol Boat (GCPB) to the Australian Department of Defence, according to the company's release. The vessel, NUSHIP *Francis Agwi*, was then gifted by the Australian Government to the Papua New Guinea Defence Force at a certificate signing ceremony held at Austal's shipyard in Henderson, Western Australia.

Twelve Pacific Island nations including Papua New Guinea, Fiji, the Federated States of Micronesia, Tonga, Solomon Islands, Cook Islands, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Palau, Samoa, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Timor-Leste will receive the vessels through to 2023. The Pacific Patrol Boat Replacement Project supports more than 200 direct jobs at Austal Australia and more than 200 indirect jobs nationally through Australian businesses contracted by Austal. Austal Australia's expanded service centre in Cairns, incorporating a 1,200 tonne (80 metre LOA) slipway and a 1,120-tonne mobile boat hoist, continues to provide in-service support to the growing Guardian-class Patrol Boat fleet; with more than 100 people now employed in a variety of engineering and sustainment roles in the Far North Queensland city. The 39.5 metre steel monohull patrol boat – designed, constructed and sustained by Austal Australia – is based on a proven design platform that has included the 38 metre Bay-class, 56 metre Armidale-class and 58 metre Cape class patrol boats that are in service with the Australian Border Force and Royal Australian Navy.



### SHOULD WE BE WORRIED?

Russian and Chinese warships conducted the first ever joint patrol in the western part of the Pacific Ocean on October 17-23, Russia's Defence Ministry said. "The joint patrolling demonstrated the state flags of Russia and China, maintained peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, and protected facilities of both countries' maritime economic activity. During the patrol, the group of warships sailed Tsugaru Strait for the first time," The Russian Navy was represented in the joint naval taskforce of ten warships by the Pacific Fleet forces that included the Marshal Krylov measuring ship, ADMIRAL TRIBUTS and the ADMIRTAL PANTELEYEV large antisubmarine warfare ships, and the ALDAR TSYDENZHAPOV and the GROMKY corvettes of project 20380. The Chinese Navy was represented by the Kunming and the Nanchang destroyers, the QINZHOU and the LUZHOU corvettes, and the DONGPINGHU supply ship. The Russian and Chinese sailors practiced joint tactical manoeuvring and held a series of drills. The warships had covered a total distance of over 1,700 nautical miles in their joint patrol. As reported earlier, the Russian and Chinese Navies held the Joint Sea 2021 three-day naval manoeuvres in the Sea of Japan.

Source: Naval News

China's turn to the outside world and its growing dependence on maritime commerce coincided with the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the start of a period in which the United States enjoyed unchallenged command of the seas. The confluence of these developments created a vulnerability of which Chinese naval strategists and political leaders were painfully aware, but about which—at first—they could do very little. U.S. power, especially naval power, also stood in the way of Beijing achieving its regional goals of absorbing Taiwan and asserting its maritime claims in the East and South China Seas. Despite these dangers, in keeping with its overall strategy, the Communist Party regime chose, in Deng Xiaoping's words, to "hide its capabilities and bide its time," relying on the prospect of mutual economic gain to check the aggressive impulses of the United States and its allies while taking advantage of the opportunities presented by the

West's engagement to build up all the elements of its own comprehensive national power.

Since the early 1990s, People's Liberation Army (PLA) planners have sought to develop weapons and operational concepts with which to counter any future U.S. effort to project power into the western Pacific. Beijing has put in place an extensive ant access/area-denial complex: a combination of reconnaissance systems and conventional precision-strike weapons capable of targeting fixed bases and mobile platforms at ever-increasing ranges from China's coasts. These are backed by, among other things, anti-satellite and cyber capabilities designed to disrupt U.S. and allied command and control, an integrated air-defence system to protect the Chinese mainland, and a modernizing, mobile nuclear force meant to deter potential attackers while broadening the array of options available to China's leaders. Beijing also has used unconventional means creatively, building islands and deploying a sizable seaborne militia to strengthen its position and assert its maritime claims. All this activity is clearly intended to deter U.S. intervention in a possible future conflict off China's coasts and to delay and defeat it should deterrence fail. In the long run, Beijing evidently hopes to "win without fighting," undermining the credibility of U.S. security guarantees, weakening its alliances, and clearing the way for China to resume its rightful place as the preponderant power in eastern Eurasia. China's leaders obviously would prefer to achieve their objectives in the Indo-Pacific through the incremental accumulation of positional advantages and without the costs and risks of a direct clash of arms. But they also are acquiring the forces and developing the doctrine they believe will give them the best chance of winning, should war become necessary. Unfortunately, Beijing's preparations are pushing it toward a posture in which the chances of success would depend heavily on pre-emption. In the western Pacific, China is building the capabilities necessary to carry out massed conventional precision strikes on the bases, forces, and reconnaissance and communication systems of the United States and its regional allies. The PLA's theory of victory appears to envision a first strike that would effectively knock the United States out of the theatre in the opening stages, accompanied by the seizure of key maritime terrain and establishment of a defensive perimeter along the first island chain, after which Beijing would presumably depend on economic suasion and threats of escalation to bring U.S. allies to terms and to discourage Washington from continuing the war.

Source: US Naval Institute


## SUGGEST YOU DO YOUUR CHRISTMAS SHOPPING NOW

The world faces "very prolonged" disruptions to shipping cargo flows, an executive at leading ports operator ICTSI said, as logistical headaches such as truck shortages weigh on backed-up supply chains and rebounding trade drives up volume. Major bottlenecks have formed across the globe in recent months due to a surge in demand for retail goods from people stuck at home under pandemic-related lockdowns and logiams impacting the supply of container ships and boxes to transport cargo. The situation has been particularly severe in major retail markets such as the United States, where dozens of vessels remain stuck off the West Coast ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, unable to discharge. "I see this as a very prolonged crisis at least on the port and land side, particularly in places like the U.S.

It's going to be tough," said Christian Gonzalez, head of corporate with Philippines-headquartered International Container Terminal Services (ICTSI).

m. ICTSI, which has container ports in a number of regions including Asia, the Middle East and South America and is among the world's top 10 container terminal operators, handled consolidated volume of 5.45 million TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent units) in the first half of 2021. That was 14% higher than the 4.79 million TEUs handled in the same period of 2020.

Source: Reuters (Reporting by Jonathan Saul; Editing by Jan Harvey)



Each dot represents a ship waiting to berth at Long Beach, California

### LIGHT HOUSE OF THE WEEK - CAPE FOULWIND

Position: 41.45.1S 171.28.0E Characteristics: FI W 12s

Range: 9NM

Structure: White concrete tower

From earliest times the Maori gave the name Tauranga to a favourite bay close to the prominent Cape Foulwind, where raiding parties from the Nelson area or from the North Island came south by canoe and found shelter.94 The first European navigator officially to see the cape was Abel Tasman who named it Clyppygen Hoek (Rocky Corner) in December 1662. Captain Cook changed the name to Cape Foulwind when he glimpsed it through the mist in foggy weather in March 1770 and wrote: "as we had not much wind and a prodigious swell rolling in upon the shore from the wsw, I did not think it safe to go nearer."

Cape Foulwind was first considered as a site for a light in 1874, however, it was not until 1876 that the light was first lit.

The original tower, built of rimu, suffered from rot. The new concrete tower was built behind the original tower, in the mid-1920s. The light in the new tower was first lit in 1926. The original light in the new tower was an automatic acetone powered light. It

provided automatic operation and was also very efficient, only requiring refuelling twice a year. The new light with its automatic operation and improved efficiency spelled the end for the keepers. The final keeper was withdrawn in 1926 when the new light became operational. In the mid-1950s the acetone light was converted to electricity which simplified maintenance even further. The original beacon has now been replaced with an LED beacon mounted on the tower balcony and powered from battery banks charged by solar panels.

